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The views presented is this paper are those of the author 
and do not necessarily represent the views of DoD or its Components.
Cyber Testing Challenges
• ICD 503: Manage Risk
• Paradigm Shift: Cyber Failures Are Not Random
– In uncontested environments, failures act like random processes
• Statistical models of risk apply
• Goal is to mitigate expected loss
– In contested environments, adversaries maximize your loss
• Need game theoretic models of risk
• Goal is to mitigate worst case loss
• Risk exposure depends on variable circumstances
– Are we at war?
– How much profit/military advantage/political value would a 
successful attack provide to adversaries?
– Are sufficient resources available for a successful attack?
– How much risk of prosecution or counterattack is there?
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Cyber Testing Challenges
• Causes and Effects Will Be Hidden
– Rice’s theorem: perfect cyber certification is impossible
• Perfect solution processes will not always terminate
• Certification must operate within reasonably short bounded time
– Attacks are designed to make them difficult to find
• Small footprint - one of a huge number of possible conditions. 
• Fragmentation – interaction of widely separated parts of code, 
• Delayed manifestation – no effect behavior until much later
• Timing – correct behavior delayed sufficiently causes failures. 
• Parasitic effects – breaking the model of computation so that 
logically correct source code can produce damaging behavior.
• Consequences are physical
• Threats can morph
3
Types of Solutions
• Expand scope of risk management
– Mitigations address both software and adversary
– Make attacks less profitable / more risky
• Improve software analysis
– Use software dependencies to find weaknesses
– Runtime monitoring
• Recover from or mitigate mishaps
– Self healing and fail safe systems
• Incorporate solutions in architecture
– The part of the system that does not change
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Architectural Solutions
• Resiliency via architecture
– Runtime testing and recovery infrastructure
– Monitor code/data integrity and physical effects
• Standardized modular security services
– Authenticated distribution of software updates
– Runtime monitoring of executable code to detect 
unauthorized changes
– Restoring corrupted code 
– Restoring execution state to a valid configuration
– Resuming execution with restored code
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Insider Threats - Turn-Key Malware
• Statistically invisible = 
impossible to detect by 
black box testing
• Clear box testing can do 
better
– Use constraint solvers to 





• Static and Dynamic Detection
– Software update service analysis
– Architecture conformance checking 
– Memory allocation checking
– Memory reference checking
– Runtime monitoring of executable code
– Runtime monitoring of data integrity constraints




• Mitigations for defense in depth
– Using pure code segments in read-only hardware
– Restoration of code from ROM
– Disabling reflective language capabilities
– Use garbage collecting programming languages to 
reduce hazards of code and data corruption
– Intensively analyze memory allocation and recycling 
facilities for memory corruption hazards
• compilers, runtime libraries, linkers, loaders, etc. 




Level Testability Level Description
0 inadequate Does not meet requirements for any of the higher levels
1 syntactic All services and data elements provided by each procurable component 
have published interfaces/data models that provide names and type 
signatures.
2 semantic Published interfaces include precise definitions of the meaning of the 
services/data, including units, connection to real world objects, and 
requirements on outputs and final states resulting from all services
3 robust Published interfaces include all assumptions and restrictions on inputs 
and states, triggering conditions for all exceptions, and expected results 
after exceptions
4 observable All system attributes relevant to checking the requirements are 
observable either via the published operational interfaces or published 
augmented testing interfaces
5 measurable All properties needed to check the requirements have clearly defined 
measurement and evaluation procedures
6 decidable Pass/fail decisions for all test cases can be made entirely by automated 
procedures, without need for subjective human judgment
7 unbounded Any number of random test inputs can be automatically generated and 
corresponding test results can be automatically checked for all services
QA for Architectures
• QA for architectures should assess their 
testability levels 
– Levels 5-7 appropriate for secure architectures
• Testability levels 6 and 7 can be augmented 
with continuous Built-in-Test capabilities
– Enables checking system integrity in the field
– Corrupted software: e.g. re-image OS
– Prognostics: e.g. replace battery soon
– Device failure: e.g. replace hard drive




• No silver bullet for cyber security.
• Best practical solutions integrate a layered set 
of defenses and mitigations
• Need runtime monitoring / recovery in addition 
to static analysis and dynamic testing 
• Security QA procedures for architectures 
should be part of OSA processes.
Recommendations
• Increase the time and effort it will take an 
adversary to compromise our systems.
– Make countermeasures part of OSA/TRF.
• Decrease the time to detect a compromise 
and restore dependable operation.
– Runtime monitoring and self-healing.
• Make system compromise prohibitively 
expensive for potential attackers.
– Integrate software, hardware, network, legal, 
political, and military countermeasures.
12
Thank you
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